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A STUDY OF LONG-LIVED ASSET IMPAIRMENT UNDER U.S. GAAP AND IFRS 
WITHIN THE U.S. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
In this paper, we explore whether differences in accounting standards influence reporting behavior 
within the U.S. institutional environment where both IFRS and U.S. GAAP are used for reporting 
purposes.  To examine this issue, we focus on the accounting for impairment of long-lived assets, 
an area where significant differences exist between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. We identify all firms 
listed in the U.S. who have recognized long-lived asset impairment losses during the 2004 to 2012 
period. From these firms, we identify firms following IFRS, and then develop a matched sample 
of U.S. GAAP firms, using a propensity score matching procedure. We examine the relation 
between impairment loss and unexpectedly high or low earnings in the year of impairment using 
a two-stage Heckman regression model, controlling for industry, country, year of write-down, and 
firm-level economic factors. We find that the association between impairment losses and 
unexpectedly high and low earnings is significantly higher for U.S. GAAP firms as compared to 
IFRS reporting firms, implying differences in accounting standards influence firm financial 
reporting. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of country level institutional factors and 
macro-economic variables, as well as inclusion of asset impairment reversals. 
 
 
Keywords: Long-lived asset write-downs, asset impairments, IFRS, U.S. GAAP. 
 
  
2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken major steps 
towards the acceptance of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In 2007, the SEC 
eliminated the requirement for foreign private issuers using IFRS as issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to reconcile IFRS financial statements to U.S. GAAP. Thus, 
investors and financial statement users in the U.S. need to be familiar with the interpretation of 
both IFRS and U.S. GAAP financial statements. Further, in 2010 the SEC expressed support for 
the continuing convergence of U.S. GAAP and IFRS (SEC Release No. 33-9109). While the U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS accounting models are similar in many respects, significant differences remain 
(SEC Staff Paper - Final Report, 2012) and the effect of these differences on reporting behavior 
within the U.S. institutional environment is unclear.  
Prior cross-national research provides evidence that a weak reporting environment has a 
stronger influence on firm reporting behavior than do exogenously determined high quality 
accounting standards (Ball, Robin and Wu 2003; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006; Daske, Hail, 
Leuz and Verdi 2008). Within the U.S., pre-2007 research provides evidence that a strong 
reporting environment may not constrain the earnings management behavior of firms from weak 
home country reporting regimes (Lang, Raedy and Wilson 2006). While prior research offers 
insight on the relation between reported earnings and the institutional environment it does not 
address the effect of differences between high quality accounting standards within a strong 
reporting environment. Given that foreign private issuers may now report in accordance with IFRS 
within the U.S. it is important to understand the effect of specific differences between U.S. GAAP 
and IFRS standards on reporting behavior.   
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One area of continuing difference is the accounting for impairment of long-lived assets (SEC 
Staff Paper - Final Report, 2012). In this paper, we examine whether the differences in accounting 
standards on impairment of long-lived assets, other than goodwill, under U.S. GAAP (ASC 360-
10-35) and under IFRS (IAS 36) influence firms’ reporting behavior in the U.S.  Understanding 
the effect of the differences in these accounting standards, if any, provides insight to standard-
setters and regulators, as well as to financial statement users seeking to understand the influence 
of accounting standards and the implications of asset write-downs on a firm’s reported earnings.  
While both U.S. GAAP and IFRS require assumptions and estimates that provide firms’ 
flexibility in determining the amount and timing of the write-down, two significant differences 
exist between the asset impairment standards that could influence the reporting behavior of firms.1 
The first is the U.S. GAAP recoverability test and the second is the reversal of impairment losses 
allowed under IFRS but prohibited under U.S. GAAP. Research of long-lived asset impairments, 
other than goodwill, in the 1990’s in the U.S. observed indications of firms recording asset write-
downs in periods of unexpectedly low earnings suggesting “big bath” reporting behavior (Riedl 
2004). Research has also observed income smoothing and “big bath” reporting behavior in non-
U.S. listed firms reporting under IAS 36 in specific country settings (Siggelkow and Zülch 2013; 
Duh, Lee and Lin 2009).  
However, while research suggests that reporting incentives within specific institutional 
environments are more important to accounting quality than accounting standards (Ball, Robin and 
Wu 2003; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006), very little research examines the behavior of firms 
using IAS 36 in the U.S. institutional setting. Nor has a study compared the reporting of firms 
under ASC 360-10-35 and IAS 36 within one country’s institutional setting.  
                                                            
1 We discuss other less fundamental differences between the standards such as, impairment indicators and the 
specifics of the calculation of the amount of the impairment loss, in the Background and Prior Research section.  
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In order to examine the reporting behavior of firms following the two asset impairment 
standards, we identify all U.S. listed firms found in Compustat North America, which includes U.S. 
and international firms, who have recognized long-lived asset impairment losses, other than 
goodwill, during the 2004 to 2012 period. From these firms we develop a matched sample, using 
propensity scores based on firm specific characteristics and year of write-down, of firms reporting 
in accordance with U.S. GAAP and firms reporting in accordance with IFRS. We compare these 
firms’ long-lived asset impairment losses, earnings, and other firm characteristics using univariate 
comparisons. In addition, we use multivariate regression analyses to examine the relation between 
impairment loss and unexpectedly high or low earnings in the year of impairment, controlling for 
country, industry, size and year. In order to mitigate any potential selection bias for our IFRS 
sample, we use the Heckman two-stage specification for our IFRS model. Since the asset 
impairment amount is related to a decline in recoverability of a firm’s assets we also control for 
economic factors i.e., industry return on assets, firm level sales and operating cash flows.  
Our multivariate analysis provides evidence of a significant negative relation between 
unexpectedly low earnings (prior to write-downs) and write-downs for firms using U.S. GAAP 
during the 2004 through 2012 period suggesting “big bath” reporting behavior. Further, we also 
find a significant positive relation between unexpectedly high earnings (prior to write-downs) and 
write-downs for U.S. GAAP firms during this same period suggesting income-smoothing behavior. 
A comparison of U.S. GAAP reporting firms and U.S. listed IFRS firms reveals that U.S. GAAP 
firms have a significantly higher association between write-downs and both unexpectedly low 
earnings (prior to write-downs) and unexpectedly high earnings (prior to write-downs) as 
compared to IFRS firms. We include alternative measures for country level institutional factors 
for the foreign private issuers in our sample with no substantive difference in our findings. Further, 
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our findings remain robust when we limit our sample to a comparison of foreign private issuers 
using U.S. GAAP reporting standards to foreign private issuers using IFRS.   
The strong regulatory and legal environment within the U.S. incentivizes the appropriate 
application of accounting standards. Therefore, one interpretation of our findings is that the 
application of ASC 360-10-35 results in the appearance of earnings management when that is not 
the intent.  An alternative explanation is that the two-step test required for determining an 
impairment loss under U.S. GAAP allows more discretion in the determination of the timing of 
impairment losses. This discretion, when coupled with the inability to reverse impairment losses, 
provide U.S. GAAP firms both the opportunity and the incentive to time the reporting of 
impairment losses in periods when there is  a need to report higher or lower earnings. 
We find that the long-lived asset write-down reporting behavior differs between firms 
applying U.S. GAAP, ASC 360-10-35, and firms applying IFRS, IAS 36, contributing to our 
understanding of the effect of differences in the reporting of U.S. listed firms under IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP standards. This evidence implies that accounting standards influence firm reporting 
behavior within the U.S. institutional setting. Our findings highlight the differences financial 
statement users may encounter in comparing U.S. GAAP and IFRS earnings for U.S. listed firms 
with seemingly similar economic conditions and transactions. Further, our evidence implies that 
differences in accounting standards are reflected in reporting behavior within strong reporting 
environments contributing to the debate on the desirability of global accounting standards.  
Our findings also contribute to the asset impairment literature by extending the findings of 
Riedl (2004) on firm behavior under U.S. GAAP and extending the IFRS asset impairment 
research to the U.S. setting. These findings should be of interest to accounting standard-setters and 
regulators as they evaluate the impact of the standards and work to improve them.  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following order. Section II provides the 
background and prior research. Section III describes the institutional setting and presents the 
hypotheses. Section IV describes the sample and presents the method for our analysis. Section V 
presents the results and additional tests. We present our conclusions in Section VI. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Overview of the U.S. GAAP and IFRS Asset Impairment Standards 
Within the U.S., there are separate standards and criteria for the accounting for impairment of 
long-lived tangible assets (ASC 360-10-35) and indefinite-lived intangible assets, including 
goodwill (ASC 350). Differences in the nature of the intangible asset, the criteria for determining 
the impairment loss as well as, a periodic impairment testing requirement for goodwill and other 
indefinite-lived intangible assets distinguish the accounting for goodwill and other intangible 
assets from long-lived tangible assets. These distinctive differences between the nature and 
accounting for indefinite-lived intangible assets and long-lived tangible assets influence the timing 
of impairment loss recognition (Banker, Basu and Byzalov 2014; Ramanna and Watts 2012; Li, 
Shroff, Venkataraman, and Zhang 2011; Hayn and Hughes 2006). For example, Banker et al. (2014) 
provide evidence that short-term economic signals such as sales change and operating cash flow 
change, have a greater impact on long-lived tangible assets than on indefinite-lived intangible 
assets. In this study, we examine whether there is a difference in the association between current 
period income and impairment losses between U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Given our focus on 
differences in specific standards and the effect on net income we limit our examination to asset 
write-downs associated with long-lived tangible asset impairments (ASC 360-10-35).  
The intent of both ASC 360-10-35 and IAS 36 is to provide a method for recognizing losses 
when the recoverable amount of a long-lived asset is less than its carrying amount on the financial 
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statements. To meet this objective the standards are similar in that they require management to use 
subjective estimates, projections, and assumptions to assess the recoverability of an asset’s 
carrying amount. Both standards require the identification of the level at which assets will be tested 
for impairment, individually or as an asset group, determination of when to test for impairment, 
and the recoverable amount, as well as the measurement and recognition of the impairment loss. 
Regardless of these similarities, differences exist within the specific guidance provided by each 
standard. For example, IFRS considers changes in market interest rates as an indicator of 
impairment whereas U.S. GAAP does not. Further, when determining the asset’s recoverable 
amount IFRS provides more specificity on the identification of the discounted cash flows. There 
are also differences in the sequence of testing for the impairment of asset groups that have 
associated goodwill. Beyond these guidance differences there are two fundamental differences 
between the standards that are recognized as being potentially more significant (SEC 2011), the 
recoverability test used to identify impairment and the reversal of impairment losses.  
U.S. GAAP requires a two-step test for determining an impairment loss. The first step is the 
recoverability test, used to identify a recognizable impairment, which requires companies to 
compare the carrying amount of a long-lived asset to its undiscounted sum of future cash flows 
(ASC 360-10-35-17). The FASB decided to use the undiscounted cash flows in this first step for 
“practical reasons” (SFAS 144 ¶B15). It is important to note that the amount of the impairment 
loss is not the difference between the carrying value of the asset and the undiscounted future cash 
flows, this test is used to determine if a recognizable impairment exists. If the asset does not pass 
the recoverability test, the second step requires measurement of the impairment loss, determined 
as the difference between the carrying amount and fair value of the asset. The determination of fair 
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value should be based on quoted market prices and if those are not available then a discounted 
cash flow approach should be used.  
The recoverability test is required in ASC 360-10-35 but disallowed in IFRS. IAS 36 uses a 
one-step approach for determination of an impairment loss. Under this standard when there is an 
indication of impairment the amount of the write-down is calculated as the excess of the asset’s 
carrying amount over its recoverable amount. Recoverable amount is defined as the higher of an 
asset’s fair value less costs to sell and its value in use. Discounted future cash flows are used in 
determining an asset’s value in use. An impairment loss is recognized to the extent that the 
recoverable amount of an asset is less than its carrying amount. In considering the measurement 
of an asset’s recoverable amount the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the 
predecessor of the IASB, specifically rejected the proposal that the recoverable amount be based 
on undiscounted cash flows. In rejecting this concept the IASC stated that the objective of the 
standard is to reflect an investment decision and that “all rational economic transactions take 
account of the time value of money” (IAS 36 ¶ BCZ13 (a)). The use of undiscounted cash flows 
in the U.S. GAAP recoverability test provides a higher threshold for recognizing an impairment 
loss. As such, it may result in a later recognition of losses under U.S. GAAP than under IFRS 
(PWC 2013). This implies that assets with similar economics may be recognized differently under 
U.S. GAAP and IFRS.  
The second fundamental difference is the ability of a firm to reverse previously recognized 
impairment losses allowed by IAS 36 but not under U.S. GAAP. Following IAS 36, at the end of 
each reporting period companies are required to assess whether there is any indication that a 
previously recognized impairment loss no longer exists or has decreased. If the company 
determines that there has been an improvement in the asset’s recoverable amount then they may 
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reverse the impairment loss. However, IAS 36 specifies that “an impairment loss recognized in 
prior periods for an asset other than goodwill shall be reversed if, and only if, there has been a 
change in the estimates used to determine the asset’s recoverable amount since the last impairment 
loss was recognized” (IAS 36 ¶114). Assuming these requirements are met, the reversal will be 
immediately recognized as a gain on the income statement in order to offset the loss originally 
recorded on the income statement for the impairment. Although a company may reverse the 
impairment loss, the increased carrying amount of the asset must not exceed the carrying amount 
of the asset had the impairment loss never been recognized. Thus, a company cannot write the 
asset above its original value under the traditional historical cost model.2  U.S. GAAP does not 
allow the restoration of previously recognized impairment losses. Therefore, although a company’s 
assets are subjected to a less strenuous recoverability test under current U.S. GAAP rules, the 
write-down or impairment loss is permanent and cannot be reversed, even if the fair value of the 
asset returns to or exceeds its original value.  
The fundamental differences between the U.S. GAAP and IFRS asset impairment standards 
have the potential to influence the write-down behavior of firm managers. In experimental studies, 
Seybert (2010) finds that the possibility of an asset impairment influences managerial behavior 
and Trottier (2013) finds that when managers know that an appropriate asset impairment loss can 
be reversed when economic conditions justify it, they are significantly more likely to record the 
impairment.   
Prior Research  
                                                            
2 Under IAS 16, a company may select to use either the cost model or the revaluation model as their accounting policy 
for a class of property, plant and equipment. The requirements, for reversal of impairment losses under the revaluation 
model, are presented in IAS 36. 
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In the U.S., prior to 1995 there was no explicit guidance on the accounting for long-term asset 
impairment. Firms applied the general guidance in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
(SFAS) No. 5 Accounting for contingencies. However concerns over the diversity of practice in 
the timing and measurement of impairment losses led the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
to issue SFAS 121 Accounting for the impairment of long-lived assets and for long-lived assets to 
be disposed of which provides specific guidance and is the basis for the general provisions found 
in ASC 360-10-35.3 SFAS 121 was effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1995. 
A comprehensive review of the literature examining the effect of write-downs in the pre-SFAS 
121 period is provided by Alciatore et al. (1998 and 2000). Given that the change in U.S. GAAP 
accounting standards may have affected the magnitude, timing, and managerial incentives related 
to write-down amounts, in this paper we focus on research examining the behavior of firms after 
the effective date of SFAS 121.  
Riedl (2004) compared the association of long-lived asset write-offs with economic factors 
and firm behavior before and after SFAS 121. Prior to SFAS 121 two types of earnings 
management behavior had been observed with asset write-downs, income smoothing and “big bath” 
behavior (Zucca and Campbell 1992). In the context of asset write-downs, income smoothing 
describes a firm that in its desire to maintain smooth earnings growth records write-downs in 
periods of unusually high earnings. Alternatively, “big bath” behavior describes a firm that records 
asset write-downs in a period when it already has lower than expected earnings providing the 
opportunity for better future earnings. Writing down an asset ensures that depreciation expense 
will be lower and therefore net income higher in future periods.  
                                                            
3 SFAS 121 was superseded in 2001 by SFAS 144 to address the accounting for a business segment that is identified 
as a discontinued operation.  
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Riedl’s (2004) results, based on a sample of 455 write-off observations from the 1992-1998 
period, reveal that write-downs under SFAS 121 have a lower association with economic factors 
and a higher association with “big bath” reporting behavior than pre-SFAS 121 write-downs. 
Further, Riedl finds that this “big bath” behavior “more likely reflects opportunistic reporting than 
managers providing information about their firms’ performance” (p. 849). This is obviously the 
opposite effect that the standard is meant to have, yet it is a consistent finding across industry, 
macro, and firm-specific variables.  
Since the time of Riedl’s (2004) study there has been a significant increase in the amount of 
negative special item reporting in the U.S. (Johnson, Lopez, and Sanchez 2011; Fairfield, Kitching, 
and Tang 2009). Johnson et al. (2011) find that restructuring charges and long-lived asset write-
offs are of significant importance to the negative special item category, finding that 39 percent of 
firms reporting a negative special item from 2001 to 2009 reported one or both of these types of 
charges. This increase in occurrence of write-offs combined with the increase in the use of IFRS 
for reporting in the U.S. provides a unique opportunity to explore the effect on reporting behavior 
of differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP within a strong institutional environment.  
From an international perspective, studies examining the effect of IAS 36 observe the behavior 
of firms from specific institutional settings (Siggelkow and Zülch 2013; Duh, Lee and Lin 2009; 
Dai, Deng, and Mao 2007; Loh and Tan 2002). While the results of these studies may not be 
generalizable to a U.S. setting, we can draw insight from their findings. Dai, Deng, and Mao (2007) 
examine the behavior of Chinese listed firms after the adoption of the China Accounting System 
for Business Enterprises which aligned Chinese long-lived asset impairment accounting standards 
with IFRS. They find evidence of “big bath” reporting behavior concluding that the adoption of 
the revised Chinese accounting system provides “more opportunities of manipulating earnings” (p. 
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363). Loh and Tan (2002) examine long-lived asset write-down behavior in Singaporean firms that 
follow accounting standards aligned with IFRS. Across their analyses of firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors they consistently find that profitability is related to long-lived asset write-
downs suggesting earnings management motives.  
Similarly, Siggelkow and Zülch (2013) examining write-off decisions of German-listed 
companies that report under IFRS, provide evidence indicating income smoothing behavior but 
not of “big-bath” reporting behavior. Siggelkow and Zülch believe these findings may be a result 
of the German institutional environment which stresses prudence, creditor protection and 
minimization of tax payments. 
One of the significant ways in which IFRS differs from U.S. GAAP is the ability of firms 
applying IFRS to reverse an impairment loss when there are internal or external sources of 
information that indicate that the impairment loss has decreased or no longer exists. Management 
is required to make this assessment at the end of each reporting period. Trottier (2013) examines 
the effect of allowing impairment loss reversals when the asset value recovers, as permitted by 
IAS 36, on Canadian managers’ decisions to recognize impairment losses. In the experiment 
managers were asked to assess the likelihood of a manager recording an indicated, material 
impairment loss. Her results suggest that the ability to reverse an impairment loss significantly 
increases the probability that managers will record such a loss.  
Duh, Lee and Lin (2009) examine whether Taiwanese listed firms that follow the equivalent 
of IAS 36 reverse asset write-downs to manage earnings. Using a sample of firms that reversed 
impairment losses they find that companies use periods of strong financial results to create reserves 
that can be used to bolster earnings in periods with weak financial results. They also find that this 
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income smoothing behavior is more prevalent for firms with higher debt ratios suggesting that 
these firms are managing earnings to avoid violation of debt covenants.  
Similar to the concept of asset write-down reversals, but using a different set of criteria, IFRS 
also allows the upward revaluation of property, plant and equipment to its fair value under the 
revaluation model (IAS 16). The revaluation model is not allowed under U.S. GAAP. The limited 
research examining IFRS asset revaluations provide evidence that the motives and effects for 
revaluations are a function of the institutional setting consistent with the evidence provided in the 
cross-national asset impairment studies (Barley, Fried, Haddad and Livnat 2007; Missonier-Piera 
2007). For example, Gordon and Hsu (2014) provide evidence that while asset write-offs under 
IFRS are more predictive of future cash flows than those under U.S. GAAP, there are differences 
in IFRS reporting behavior between firms from strong legal enforcement as compared to low legal 
enforcement institutional environments.  
Overall, prior research examining reporting under IAS 36 and ASC 360-10-35 provides 
evidence that firms are able to manipulate earnings through asset impairments within specific 
country settings. Cross-national research also implies that differences in institutional factors 
influence that behavior. However, whether there are differences in the behavior of firms reporting 
under the U.S. GAAP and IFRS asset impairment standards within the U.S. institutional setting 
has not been examined.  
 
III. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND HYPOTHESES 
Institutional Setting 
Cross-national research has found that the institutional setting influences firms’ reporting 
incentives (Leuz et al. 2003; Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008; 
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Houqe, van Zijl, Dunstan and Karim 2012). This evidence appears consistent with the differential 
findings on reporting behavior under IAS 36. Gordon and Hsu (2014) provide evidence suggesting 
that the informativeness of asset write-downs depends on the institutional setting and Siggelkow 
and Zülch’s (2013) evidence of income smoothing reporting behavior is consistent with 
Germany’s institutional setting.   
The institutional environment in the U.S. is based on a common law legal system with a large 
equity market, strong investor protection rights and a strong legal enforcement system (LaPorta et 
al. 1997 and 1998; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003). Burgstahler et al. (2006) find that strong legal 
systems and capital market forces are associated with higher earnings quality suggesting that “the 
first order effect of capital markets is to increase earnings informativeness” (p. 1013). Further, Ball, 
Robin and Wu (2003) in an analysis of East Asian countries provide evidence that the market and 
political forces forming a country’s institutional setting have a greater impact on financial 
reporting quality than do high quality accounting standards.  
However, Lang et al. (2006) provide evidence suggesting that the strong regulatory 
environment in the U.S. does not override the effect of the home country reporting regime. 
Examining reconciled earnings for U.S. listed foreign firms for the period 1991 – 2002; they find 
that non-U.S. firms exhibit more earnings management than do U.S. firms. While they did not 
specifically consider the effect of IFRS reporting they did find that their results held even for 
foreign firms that reported using U.S. GAAP in their home country. Within the U.S. market we 
also have evidence implying that the institutional setting is influencing financial reporting. Kim, 
Li and Li (2012) find that U.S. listed firms reporting in accordance with IFRS without 
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP have not experienced negative capital market consequences. Taken 
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together this evidence leaves open the question of whether differences between U.S. GAAP and 
IFRS are influencing reporting behavior within the U.S. setting.  
We consider this question and add to this research by examining the asset impairment 
reporting behavior of U.S. listed firms using accounting standards with recognized differences, 
IAS 36 and ASC 360-10-35. Prior to the acceptance within the U.S. of IFRS for foreign private 
issuers, reconciliations were required between U.S. GAAP and IFRS (20-F reconciliations).   
Research examining these reconciliations provide evidence of significant differences between 
reported net income under the two sets of standards during the 2004-2006 period, with long-lived 
asset impairments being the second most common reconciliation category (Henry, Lin and Yang 
2009). Examining a specific difference in accounting standards within the same institutional 
setting allows us to add to the discussion over the influence of accounting standards and 
institutional environment on financial reporting.  
Hypotheses 
We are interested in whether the U.S. GAAP and IFRS long-lived asset impairment standards 
result in different firm reporting behavior in the U.S. setting. The U.S. is recognized as one of the 
most shareholder-focused countries in the world with strong investor rights and legal enforcement 
(Stout, 2012; LaPorta, et al., 1998). Therefore, this setting allows us to examine whether 
differences in accounting standards influence reporting behavior within a strong institutional 
environment. Ball et al. (2003) report evidence that the institutional setting has a stronger influence 
on reporting behavior than high quality accounting standards, exogenously determined, within 
weak investor protection environments. Leuz et al. (2003) find that investor protection is a more 
influential determinant of earnings management behavior than accounting rules that are 
endogenously determined. The U.S. setting is unique in that it provides a strong investor protection 
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environment in which we may examine the differences between high quality accounting standards, 
one developed within that environment (U.S. GAAP) and the other exogenously determined 
(IFRS). The strong institutional environment provides a high level of assurance on the appropriate 
application of the standards.   
As described previously both standards seek to ensure that assets are not reported in financial 
statements at more than their recoverable amount. However, there are two fundamental differences 
between the asset impairment standards: the recoverability test required under U.S. GAAP but not 
allowed under IFRS, and the reversal of impairment losses allowed under IFRS but prohibited 
under U.S. GAAP. These differences in the standards may result in different reporting behavior 
by U.S. listed firms. There is evidence that firms within the U.S. institutional environment 
following U.S. GAAP are able to time the reporting of asset impairments to periods when earnings 
are unexpectedly low, “big bath” behavior, but no evidence of income smoothing behavior (Riedl 
2004). Outside of the U.S., there is evidence of both income smoothing and ‘big bath’ reporting 
behavior associated with asset impairments by firms following IFRS (Dai, Deng, and Mao 2007; 
Duh, Lee and Lin 2009; Siggelkow and Zülch 2013).  
However, regardless of the differences in the standards, if the U.S. institutional environment 
has a stronger influence on firm reporting behavior than accounting standards, then we would 
expect to see similar reporting behavior between firms following U.S. GAAP and IFRS. To 
investigate this expectation we examine the asset impairment reporting behavior of U.S. listed 
firms and test the following hypotheses.  
H1: There is no difference in the relation between long-lived asset impairment write-downs 
and unexpectedly low earnings for U.S. GAAP reporting firms and U.S. listed IFRS 
reporting firms. 
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H2: There is no difference in the relation between long-lived asset impairment write-downs 
and unexpectedly high earnings for U.S. GAAP reporting firms and U.S. listed IFRS 
reporting firms. 
 
If we find no difference in reporting behavior, it indicates that the U.S. institutional 
environment is influencing reporting behavior or that regardless of the differences in the standards, 
the reporting under the IFRS and U.S. GAAP standards is substantially equal. If however, we find 
a difference in reporting behavior, ceteris paribus, it indicates that, within a strong institutional 
environment, differences in accounting standards are influencing reporting behavior.  
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHOD 
Sample Selection 
To develop the sample for our study, we identify all public companies within Compustat North 
America recording a write-down from 2004 to 2012.4 We select only firms listed in the U.S. and 
subject to U.S. financial reporting requirements. Prior to 2007, foreign private issuers listed in the 
U.S. that reported in accordance with IFRS were required to provide reconciliations between IFRS 
and U.S. GAAP in Form 20-F filings. Since 2007, foreign private issuers listed on U.S. stock 
exchanges are no longer required to prepare reconciliations to U.S. GAAP if their financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB.5 Thus IFRS financial 
statements are available within the U.S. market providing a favorable setting for examining the 
impact of differences in exogenously and endogenously determined reporting standards. 6  In 
                                                            
4 We use the Compustat item “WDP” which includes 1) Impairment of assets other than goodwill, and 2) Write-
down/write-off of assets other than goodwill, which excludes impairment of goodwill and impairment of unamortized 
intangibles. Therefore, it is possible the asset impairments include other amortizable intangible assets. However, while 
this is a limitation of our study its effect is mitigated since the size of intangible assets (with either a definite or 
indefinite life) other than goodwill (ITANO) is $248 ($0.56) million in mean (median) during our sample period while 
total fixed assets is $1,241 ($24.0) million.  
5 The SEC acceptance of financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB was effective 
for fiscal years ending after November 15, 2007. 
6 A natural setting for the testing of our hypotheses would be to compare the U.S. GAAP write-down amount with the 
IFRS write-down amount for the same U.S. listed IFRS reporting firms in the pre-2007 period where U.S. GAAP 
reconciliations were required. However, when we reviewed the 20-F reconciliations for a sample of 33 of the 75 firm-
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developing the sample, we exclude companies which do not indicate the accounting standard that 
was used and other missing data needed for our models. We include IFRS asset write-down firms 
reported as having standards that are compliant with IFRS as required by the U.S. SEC.7 This 
produces 7,478 potential firm-year observations, of which 578 are IFRS and 6,900 are U.S. GAAP 
firm-year observations.  
For our setting, we believe there could be two primary sources of potential selection bias. First, 
a foreign incorporated firm’s decision to be cross-listed in the U.S. stock exchanges is not a random 
decision. Second, a foreign firm which is cross-listed in U.S. stock exchanges also has to select an 
accounting standard: U.S. GAAP or IFRS. This decision may not be a random decision, either. 
Successfully controlling for these potential selection biases is critical to draw any meaningful 
inferences from our results.8  
To address the first selection bias issue, related to a foreign firm’s decision to be cross-listed 
in the U.S. stock market, we adopt the two-stage approach suggested by Heckman (1979). In the 
first stage, we model a firm’s decision to be cross-listed, and compute the Inverse Mill’s Ratio, 
which is added as a control variable to the model to correct the selection bias in the second stage. 
                                                            
year write-downs in our pre-2007 sample period, we found that 20-F reconciliations either were not available (10 
observations) or specific item reconciliation amounts for write-downs were not provided (22 observations). Due to 
the lack of data we are unable to directly compare the write-down amount under U.S GAAP and IFRS for the same 
firm. 
7 IFRS data is presented at pre-reconciliation amounts in the Compustat North American database for fiscal years 
ending prior to the SEC’s elimination of the 20-F reconciliation requirement. To confirm this claim, we took a sample 
of 33 IFRS firms and compared their specific Compustat data with IFRS data from the firms’ Form 20-F filings. 
Without exception, all Compustat data matched IFRS information. 
8 Ideally, we would like to compare U.S firms that use U.S. GAAP to U.S. firms that use IFRS in the U.S. market. 
This method will allow us to test the impact of accounting standards after controlling for the regulatory environment 
and firms’ country of incorporation. There is very few cases, however, that U.S. incorporated firms that use IFRS in 
the U.S. market during our sample period. As an alternative, our current research design compares the U.S. firms that 
use GAAP and the non-U.S. firms that use IFRS in the same stock market. However, we acknowledge the limitation 
of this matched sample approach because the U.S. firms and the non-U.S. firms are fundamentally different. 
Consequently, even our matched sample approach and the Heckman’s two-stage approach can not completely rule out 
the possibility that our results are driven by the fundamental difference between the U.S. vs. non-U.S. firms in the 
U.S. stock markets.  
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To address the second selection bias, related to a foreign firm’s decision to select between U.S. 
GAAP versus IFRS, we compare IFRS asset write-down firm-years to their matched U.S. GAAP 
asset write-down firm-years, generated by a propensity matching process (see Tucker 2010). Our 
sample of foreign private issuers that report in accordance with IFRS in the U.S. is similar to those 
matched U.S. firms that use U.S. GAAP in the U.S. in size (market capitalization), profitability 
(ROA), and growth potential (book-to-market ratio). In the propensity matching procedure, we 
first estimate a probability (or propensity score) that a firm will select IFRS with a given set of 
firm characteristics (size, ROA, and book-to-market ratio). Then we identify a firm-year 
observation with the closest probability within the U.S. GAAP asset write-down firm-years to 
identify a matched firm-year observation.  
Our matching procedure allows us to control for certain factors affecting management 
incentives to manipulate earnings i.e., profitability and growth potential (Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997; Barton and Waymire, 2004; Graham et al. 2005; Badertscher, 2011). There are other factors, 
identified in prior research that may influence management incentives such as, CEO tenure and 
type of CEO compensation contract (Matsunaga and Park 2001). However, this information is not 
publically available for our sample firms.  
In our matching procedure, we include industry and year of write-down in addition to the 
propensity score in order to mitigate the impact of within industry and between year macro-
economic changes that may influence managerial incentives related to write-downs.9 Since we 
match our U.S. GAAP and IFRS sample firm-years based on year of write-down and industry, we 
expect that any exogenous shock, such as the financial crisis that occurred during our sample 
                                                            
9 Results from excluding the year of write-down from the sample matching process confirms our main results that is, 
significant differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS for the BATHINCENT (χ2=2.11, p=.07) and SMOOTHINCENT 
(χ2=2.31, p=.06) variables.  
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period, affects both groups (U.S. GAAP and IFRS reporting firms) equally with respect to their 
reporting behavior.   
The matching process resulted in 11 IFRS firm-year observations being eliminated because 
we were unable to appropriately match them with U.S. GAAP firm-year observations. Our final 
matched sample consists of 567 IFRS and 567 U.S. GAAP firm-year observations. Table 1 
contains a summary of the sample selection process.10  
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2 summarizes the demographics of the U.S. listed IFRS sample. Panel A of Table 2 
reveals that Canada is the most represented country with 189 firm-year observations, over 33 
percent of all IFRS firm-year observations in the sample. The United Kingdom is the next most 
represented country with 74 firm-year observations, over 13 percent of all IFRS firm-year 
observations in the sample. Panel B of Table 2 reveals that the year 2012 has more observations 
in our IFRS sample than any other year; this is primarily a result of Canada requiring the use of 
IFRS for listed firms beginning in 2011. Panel C reveals that the IFRS companies found in the 
Compustat North America dataset represent diverse industries according to the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS). The most frequent industry among the IFRS firm-year 
observations according to GICS is Materials, making up over 21 percent of the sample.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Method  
                                                            
10 Out of our sample of 567 IFRS firm-years, only 6 of the firm-years are voluntary adopters. This is consistent with 
our sample composition where we have 5 firm-year observations in 2004, prior to the 2005 mandatory adoption of 
IFRS in the European Union. Exclusion of voluntary adopters from our sample did not change the results substantively. 
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We examine the validity of our sample matching process using univariate statistics to compare 
the firm specific characteristics of the IFRS sample and the matched U.S. GAAP sample. We then 
analyze the relation between write-downs and unexpectedly low and unexpectedly high earnings 
for IFRS and U.S. GAAP firm-years separately using the following two-stage Heckman regression 
model (Lennox, Francis, and Wang, 2012), adapted from Riedl (2004) and Francis et al. (1996).11  
        WDP_ATit = α + β1 BATHINCENTit + β2 SMOOTHINCENTit+ β3 ∆INDROAit  
                              + β4 ∆SALESit + β5 ∆OCFit + β6 logMARKETCAPit + β6 MILLSit + εit                    (1) 
where:   
WDP_ATit      = Firm i’s pre-tax asset write-off (reflected as a positive amount) for 
period t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1; 
BATHINCENTit = Firm i’s proxy for “earnings big bath” incentive, equal to the change in 
firm i’s pre-write-off earnings from t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the 
end of t-1, when this change is below the median of non-zero negative 
values of this variable, and 0 otherwise; 
SMOOTHINCENTit = Firm i’s proxy for “earnings smoothing” incentive equal to the change 
in firm i’s pre-write-off earnings from t-1 to t, divided by total assets at 
the end of t-1, when this change is above the median of non-zero 
negative values of this variable, and 0 otherwise; 
∆INDROAit = The median change in firm i’s (2-digit SIC) industry ROA from period 
t-1 to t; 
∆SALESit = Firm i’s percent change in sales from period t-1 to t; 
∆OCFit = Firm i’s change in operating cash flows from period t-1 to t, divided by 
total assets at the end of t-1; 
logMARKETCAPit = Firm i’s proxy for size, equal to natural logarithm of market 
capitalization, calculated as fiscal-year closing stock price multiplied by 
number of outstanding common shares for period t; 
MILLSit = Firm i’s inverse Mills ratio estimated from the Heckman's selection 
model 
  
The dependent variable of the Heckman second-stage OLS model (1) is WDP_AT, which is 
the pre-tax asset write-down (reflected as a positive amount) for period t, divided by total assets at 
the end of t-1. In our model we include the variables, BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit , to 
                                                            
11 Unlike Riedl (2004) and Francis et al. (1996) who use a Tobit regression model we use an OLS regression model 
since we do not include non-write-down firms in our sample. However, the use of Tobit regressions did not change 
our results. Further, we do not include a variable for change in earnings in our models because in our sample change 
in earnings is highly correlated (over 69%) with both of our variables of interest, BATHINCENTit and 
SMOOTHINCENTit , as such inclusion in the models results in high variance inflation factors indicating severe 
multicollinearity producing unstable models.  
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capture reporting incentives that may exist when earnings are unexpectedly low, “big bath” 
incentives, and unexpectedly high, income smoothing incentives. BATHINCENTit is measured as 
the change in pre-write-off earnings from the previous year, divided by total assets of the previous 
year, when this change is below the median of non-zero negative values, and 0 otherwise. This 
variable has a predicted negative sign. SMOOTHINCENTit is measured as the change in pre-write-
off earnings from the previous year, divided by total assets of the last year, when this change is 
above the median of nonzero positive values, and 0 otherwise. The predicted sign of the 
SMOOTHINCENTit variable is positive. These variables are constructed consistent with Riedl 
(2004) and Francis et al. (1996). We estimate two separate regression models: one for the U.S. 
GAAP sample and another for the IFRS sample, and test whether the coefficients for 
BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit obtained from each regression model are statistically 
different using the Wald test (Judge et al. 1985).12  
We include in our regression model ∆INDROAit capturing the effects of industry-specific 
changes on asset write-downs since economic conditions in less robust industries may require more 
asset write-downs than from firms in healthier industries. We measure this variable as the change 
from prior year in median return on assets (ROA) in industry as grouped by two-digit SIC code. 
We predict a negative association between write-downs (recorded as a positive amount) and 
∆INDROAit. Next, we include two variables, ∆SALESit and ∆OCFit, to capture the effects of firm-
specific performance changes on asset write-downs. ∆SALESit is measured as the percentage 
change in sales of a firm from the prior year. ∆OCFit is measured as the change in operating cash 
flows of a firm from the prior year, divided by the previous year total assets. We predict that both 
variables will have negative signs. We also include logMARKETCAPit, Year Dummy, Country 
                                                            
12 Conducting one regression with an indicator variable for IFRS and U.S. GAAP firms and a fully interacted model 
produces identical results. 
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Dummy, and Industry Dummy in the model to control for the effect of firm size, year, industry, and 
country, respectively. logMARKETCAPit equals the log of the firm’s market value, calculated as 
fiscal-year closing stock price, multiplied by the number of outstanding common shares for the 
year.13  
To control for the selection bias regarding IFRS firm’s decision to be cross-listed in the U.S. 
we conduct the Heckman two-stage procedure (Heckman 1979; Lennox, Francis, and Wang 2012). 
We run our first stage model with IFRS firms’ decision to be cross-listed as the dependent variable 
with a set of independent variables, identified by prior studies (Lang, et al. 2003). As well as 
controlling for company size (logASSETS), leverage (LEVERAGE), and profitability (ROA), we 
include the firm’s industry median Tobin's q (TOBINQ) and the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). We also include industry and year indicator variables to control for the cross-sectional 
difference (e.g. the product market difference) and the fixed year effect.  In addition, we include 
an indicator variable for the country legal system (English, French, German, Scandinavian, and 
others). From this first-stage model, we calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio, which is added to the 
second-stage model (1) above.  
 
V. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
                                                            
13 The quality of the auditor may also influence reporting behavior. Therefore, we conducted a regression model 
including an indicator variable based on size of the audit firm as a proxy for auditor quality, coded 1 for use of a Big 
4 auditor and 0 otherwise. We found no significance for the audit quality variable and found very little impact on the 
coefficient estimates for our other variables; the coefficients on BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit were -.097 
(t = 2.31, p < .05) and .183 (t = 2.64, p < .05) for the U.S. GAAP firms, respectively, and -.003 (t = -.06, p > .1) and 
-.003 (t = -.08, p > .1) for the IFRS firms, respectively. We do not include the audit quality variable in the main 
regression model because we do not have auditor data available for all firms resulting in a small reduction in our 
sample size (n = 563 and n = 565, for IFRS and U.S. GAAP, respectively).  
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Descriptive statistics on firm specific characteristics and the model variables for the IFRS and 
U.S. firm-years observations in the matched sample are provided in Table 3. The univariate 
comparison results presented in Table 3 support the validity of our sample matching selection 
process. The matched U.S. GAAP sample is similar to the IFRS sample in size (market 
capitalization), profitability (ROA), and growth potential (book-to-market ratio). Two-tailed t-tests 
of mean difference reveal that for the measurements of earnings management, neither the indicator 
of “big bath” reporting behavior (BATHINCENTit) nor income smoothing behavior 
(SMOOTHINCENTit) is significantly (p < .10) different for U.S. GAAP firms as compared to IFRS 
firms. We also find that size (measured by market capitalization), return on equity, and return on 
assets are not significantly different between IFRS and U.S. GAAP firm-years.  
[Insert Table 3] 
Panels A and B of Table 4 present the Pearson and the Spearman correlation coefficients 
among the model variables for the U.S. and the IFRS firm-year observations, respectively. Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented in the upper (lower) right diagonal in the table. 
Examining the Pearson correlation coefficients, we find that the write-down amount (WDP_AT) 
for U.S. GAAP firms is highly correlated with both the BATHINCENTit (-.209, p < .001) and 
SMOOTHINCENTit (.295, p < .001) variables. Whereas, for IFRS reporting firms there is a much 
lower correlation between WDP_ATit and the earnings management indicator variables, 
BATHINCENTit (-.130, p < .01) and SMOOTHINCENTit (.116, p < .01). Based on this univariate 
analysis, these correlations imply that there is a stronger relation between asset impairment write-
downs and earnings management in U.S. GAAP firms than in IFRS firms. As expected the firm 
financial performance variables, ∆SALESit and ∆OCFit, are significantly correlated across the IFRS 
25 
 
and U.S. GAAP samples. These findings are consistent across both the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation analyses.   
[Insert Table 4] 
 Empirical Findings 
Table 5 presents the multivariate regression analysis and comparison of coefficients 
conducted to test whether there are differences in the asset write-down behavior of U.S. GAAP 
and IFRS firms. For the IFRS firms, we report results from the two-stage Heckman model as well 
as from the OLS model, following the suggestion from Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012). The 
amount of variation that is explained by the models as indicated by the adjusted R2 is 24% for the 
U.S. GAAP model and 22% for the IFRS Heckman model.  
For the U.S. GAAP firms, reported in column (1), the coefficient on the BATHINCENTit 
variable (t-statistic = -4.68, p < .01) is significant and negative. Based on interpretation of similar 
results from prior research (Riedl 2004) this result suggests that U.S. GAAP firms may be 
recognizing asset write-downs in periods of unexpectedly low earnings implying “big bath” 
behavior. In addition, the coefficient on the SMOOTHINCENTit variable is positive and significant 
(t-statistic = 2.78, p < .01) suggesting that U.S. GAAP firms may be  recognizing write-downs in 
periods of unexpectedly high earnings implying income smoothing behavior. The size variable, 
logMARKETCAPit, is negative and significant (p < .01) indicating an association between the size 
of the firm and the write-down. Out of the two control variables structured to capture the effects 
of firm-specific performance on asset write-downs, the coefficient on ∆SALESit is significantly 
negative (t = -2.24, p < .05), while ∆OCFit reports only a marginally significant coefficient (t = -
1.88, p < .10). These relations are consistent with the notion that a firm’s poor financial 
performance is associated with asset write-downs. Overall, the U.S. GAAP findings suggest that 
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the asset impairment standard in U.S. GAAP, ASC 360-10-35, may provide managers discretion 
to opportunistically report impairment losses.   
[Insert Table 5] 
Our findings differ from those of Riedl (2004) on the behavior of U.S. firms in the post-SFAS 
121 period. Riedl (2004) finds evidence of “big bath” reporting behavior but not of income 
smoothing behavior based on his sample of 265 firm-year write-down observations from the post 
SFAS 121, 1995 – 1998 period. Our full U.S. GAAP sample contains 5,425 firm-year write-down 
observations from the 2004 - 2012 period. As discussed in the Additional tests section, when we 
conduct the regression model for the full U.S. GAAP sample we find consistent results with our 
matched sample, both the BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit variables are significantly 
associated with asset write-downs. This indicates that the difference with Riedl’s (2004) findings 
may be due to differences in the model specifications,14 time period examined or the difference in 
number of sample write-down observations. That is, given the size of our sample there are more 
opportunities to observe both “big bath” and income smoothing behavior.  
Column (4) in Table 5 reports the second stage of the Heckman model results for the IFRS 
firms. Neither the coefficient on BATHINCENTit (t = 0.41), nor the coefficient on 
SMOOTHINCENTit (t = 0.44) variable is significant. This finding suggests that the IFRS firms in 
our sample are not using asset impairment write-downs to engage in earnings management 
behavior. The size variable, logMARKETCAPit, is negative and significant (t = -6.00, p < .01), 
consistent with our finding from the U.S. sample. None of the other control variables are 
                                                            
14 Our model specification is different from that of Riedl (2004) in that unlike Riedl’s model we do not include a 
variable capturing the change in firm pre-write-off earnings (∆E) due to high correlations (over 69% in the U.S. GAAP 
sample) between ∆E and BATHINCENT and SMOOTHINCENT. In addition Riedl includes both write-down and non-
write-down firms in his regression model.  
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statistically significant. Column (2) reports the results from the OLS model for the IFRS firms, 
and the main results are consistent with those from the Heckman two-stage model. That is, neither 
the BATHINCENTit, nor the SMOOTHINCENTit variable is significant. 
We hypothesize that there is no difference in the association of long-lived asset impairment 
write-downs and unexpectedly low or unexpectedly high earnings for U.S. GAAP firms as 
compared to IFRS firms in the U.S institutional setting. To test these hypotheses we compare the 
regression coefficients between U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms, using the Wald test. The results, 
presented in Column (5) in Table 5, reveal that the association between BATHINCENTit and write-
offs for U.S. GAAP firms is significantly higher than for IFRS firms (χ2 = 3.68, p < .05). The 
results, presented in Table 5, also reveal that the association between SMOOTHINCENTit and 
write-offs for U.S. GAAP firms is significantly higher than for IFRS firms (χ2 = 5.55, p < .01). 
These findings are not consistent with the hypotheses of no differences in H1 and H2. 
Overall, our findings provide evidence that there is a difference in the write-off behavior for 
U.S. listed firms following U.S. GAAP as compared to firms following IFRS within the U.S. 
institutional environment. The association between asset impairment write-offs and “big bath” and 
income smoothing reporting behavior in U.S. GAAP firms is significantly higher than that 
observed in U.S. listed IFRS firms. U.S. GAAP firms appear to opportunistically time the write-
down of asset impairments consistent with earnings management behavior whereas we find no 
significant relation between write-downs in the period of unusually low or high earnings for IFRS 
firms. Contrary to our hypotheses, our evidence implies that the differences in the asset impairment 
standards are influencing firm reporting behavior within the U.S. It may be that U.S. GAAP and/or 
IFRS reporting firms would react differently in other institutional environments. However, that 
question is beyond the scope of this study.  
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Additional Tests  
Foreign Private Issuers Sample 
To determine if unmeasured differences between U.S. domestic firms and foreign firms are 
influencing our results, we compare the asset impairment reporting behavior of foreign firms that 
use U.S. GAAP reporting in the U.S. (1,475 firm-year observations) to foreign firms that use IFRS 
for U.S. reporting purposes.15 The results, presented in Table 6, are consistent with our sample of 
U.S. domestic firms. That is, the association between both BATHINCENTit and 
SMOOTHINCENTit and write-downs is significantly higher for foreign firms reporting in 
accordance with U.S. GAAP than for foreign firms reporting in accordance with IFRS. Column 
(5) in Table 6 reports that the association between BATHINCENTit and write-offs for foreign firms 
that use U.S. GAAP in the U.S. is significantly higher than for foreign firms that use IFRS in the 
U.S. (χ2 = 4.81, p < .05). In addition, the association between SMOOTHINCENTit and write-offs 
for foreign firms that use U.S. GAAP is significantly higher than for IFRS firms, and this 
difference is marginally significant at the 10 percent level (χ2 = 2.43, p < .1).  
This result confirms our main finding in that the association between asset write-downs and 
unexpectedly high and low earnings is stronger for firms that use U.S. GAAP as compared to those 
that use IFRS within the U.S. institutional setting regardless of whether those firms are 
incorporated within the U.S. or in a foreign country.16  
[Insert Table 6] 
Alternative Measures of Country Level Institutional Factors 
                                                            
15 We did not form a matched sample from foreign firms that use the U.S. GAAP reporting for the corresponding IFRS 
firms because there are too few firm-year observations in each industry sector within the same year for the U.S. GAAP 
reporting foreign firms’ sample, making it difficult to match a comparable U.S. GAAP firm for each IFRS firm. 
16 We note that foreign private issuers that choose to use U.S. GAAP for reporting purposes within the U.S. have self-
selected to use U.S. GAAP. We have not controlled for self-selection bias in our model due to the small number of 
foreign firms that use IFRS, as discussed earlier. Therefore, while these results provide interesting information they 
should be interpreted with this limitation in mind. 
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It is also possible that while we controlled for country of origin within the regression analysis 
there are similarities among countries in institutional factors that are influencing our results. To 
determine if the country of origin of the foreign private issuers in our sample influences reporting 
behavior, we categorize countries based on whether they are an outsider or insider economy. We 
use this categorization since Leuz et al. (2003) observed significant cross-national differences in 
earnings management behavior across these groups. Leuz et al. (2003) grouped countries into three 
clusters based on similarities in their institutional characteristics identifying outsider economies 
and two levels of insider economies. The countries in our sample fall into two categories. We 
categorize Canada, Australia and the U.K., along with the U.S. as outsider economies with large 
stock markets, strong legal enforcement and outsider rights. Whereas, the remaining countries in 
our sample are classified as insider economies with smaller stock markets, a weaker investor 
protection environment and a somewhat weaker legal enforcement environment as compared to 
the outsider economies.  
We conduct the regression analysis separately for the IFRS firms from outsider and insider 
economies. We find results consistent with our full IFRS sample findings, the BATHINCENTit and 
SMOOTHINCENTit variables are not significant for either country grouping. For the outsider 
country sample, the coefficient on BATHINCENTit variable is 0.029 (p = 0.45) and on 
SMOOTHINCENTit is -0.009 (p = -0.24). For the insider country regression, the coefficients on the 
BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit are -0.049 (p = -0.91) and 0.022 (p = 0.66), respectively. 
Asset Impairment Reversals 
Since asset impairment reversals are a distinguishing feature of IAS 36 that may influence 
reporting behavior, we investigate whether the reversal of impairment losses, allowed under IFRS 
but not under U.S. GAAP affects our main results presented in Table 5. To identify reversals of 
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long-lived asset impairments we examined the 10-K and 20-F filings for the 567 IFRS firms 
included in our sample.17 Through this process we obtained 63 observations of reversals.  
We modified our main regression model (1) by adding a reversal variable, REVERSALit, and 
two interaction variables, REVERSALit×BATHINCENTit and REVERSALit×SMOOTHINCENTit. 
The REVERSALit variable is coded 1 if a firm has a reversal of a long-lived impairment loss during 
our sample period and zero, otherwise. We present the results of this regression model in Table 7. 
We find that the addition of these variables does not alter our main findings in Table 5. The 
REVERSALit variable and the two interaction variables are not significantly associated with firms’ 
write-off amounts for our sample IFRS firms. Further, consistent with our main findings, the 
coefficients on BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit are also not significant.  
[Insert Table 7] 
IFRS Sample Composition 
It is also possible that IFRS firms from Canada are influencing our results since they comprise 
33.3% of our IFRS sample. To examine this possibility, we partition our IFRS sample into 
Canadian and non-Canadian firms. We conduct the regression analyses, not reported, separately 
for the Canadian and non-Canadian IFRS firms. In each sample group, the findings are consistent 
with the full matched IFRS sample. That is, the BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit variables 
are not statistically significant for either Canadian or non-Canadian IFRS firms.18 Moreover, the 
coefficients for BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit between those two subsamples (i.e. 
                                                            
17 While companies typically disclose their reversal information in the PP&E footnote or in a separate section under 
Impairment we searched the entire 10-K and 20-F filings of each firm for reversal data.  
 
18 BATHINCENTit and SMOOTHINCENTit are t = .81 (p > .1) and t = -.27 (p > .1) for the Canadian firms, respectively; 
and t = -1.36 (p > .1) and t = .91 (p > .1) for the non-Canadian firms, respectively. 
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Canadian and non-Canadian IFRS firms) are not statistically different from each other indicating 
that our results are not driven by the Canadian firms in our sample. 
U.S. GAAP Firms 
Another possible explanation for our results is that our matching process identified U.S. 
GAAP firms with specific characteristics that are not generalizable to the U.S. GAAP population. 
However, when we conduct the regression model for the full U.S. GAAP sample (5,425 U.S. 
GAAP firm-year observations) we find consistent results, presented in Table 8, with our matched 
sample, both the BATHINCENTit (t = -3.14, p < .01) and SMOOTHINCENTit  (t = 3.94, p < .01) 
variables are significantly associated with asset write-offs.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Macro-Economic Influence 
 The proxies used to capture macro-economic effects may also be influencing our results. In 
our model, we include the dummy variables for each of our sample years (Year Dummy), to control 
for macro-economic annual differences, while Riedl (2004) includes the percentage change in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in his model. To determine if our results are affected by GDP we 
include both variables, the change in GDP and the year dummy variables, and repeat our analysis. 
We find that the change in GDP is not statistically significantly associated with firms’ write-off 
amounts and no other inferences from our model change.19  
Other Issues 
We also incorporate capital expenditures and restructuring charges in our models as additional 
control variables (results not reported) since these items may influence write-down behavior. The 
                                                            
19 Results from including the change in GDP in the regression models and conducting the comparison of the regression 
coefficients between the U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms confirm our main results of significant differences on the 
BATHINCENTit (χ2 = 2.57, p < .05) and SMOOTHINCENTit (χ2 = 6.15, p < .01) variables.  
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inclusion of these two additional variables does not change our main results qualitatively. In 
addition, as a robustness test, we use fixed assets instead of total assets in the matching process. 
Analyses using this new matched control sample produce consistent results with our main findings.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior research suggests that reporting incentives within specific institutional environments are 
more important to accounting quality than accounting standards (Ball, Robin and Wu 2003; 
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006). However, prior studies have not examined the effect of 
differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS within a strong institutional environment.  In this study, 
we examine whether the differences in impairment of long-lived asset accounting standards under 
U.S. GAAP (ASC 360-10-35) and under IFRS (IAS 36) influence firms’ reporting behavior in the 
U.S. setting, where reporting in accordance with U.S. GAAP is required for domestic companies 
and in accordance with IFRS is allowed for foreign private issuers. To examine this issue we 
identify U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms listed in the U.S. that have asset impairment write-downs 
during the 2004 – 2012 period. From these firms we develop a matched sample of IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP firms based on firm specific characteristics using propensity matching scores and industry 
and year of write-down. We conduct univariate and multivariate analyses to examine the relation 
between asset write-downs and unexpectedly low and unexpectedly high earnings (prior to write-
downs) for our IFRS and U.S. GAAP firm-year observations while controlling for firm and 
industry-level economic variables, as well as year of write-down and country. Additionally we 
employ the Heckman two-stage model for our IFRS sample to mitigate any potential selection bias. 
Overall, our evidence indicates that the association between “big bath” and income smoothing 
behavior and asset write-downs is significantly higher for U.S. GAAP firms than for IFRS firms. 
Since we limited our sample to firms listed in the U.S., controlled for firm specific economic 
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factors, and matched our IFRS and U.S. GAAP firm-year observations, our evidence implies that 
the difference in reporting behavior is associated with the difference in the asset impairment 
standards. Given that prior research finds that, the institutional setting influences reporting 
behavior our findings should be interpreted specific to the U.S. environment. These findings 
should be of interest to financial statement users as they consider the impact of asset write-downs 
on U.S. GAAP reported income, as well as the effect on comparisons between U.S. GAAP and 
IFRS reported incomes that include asset write-downs. 
Our findings suggest the possibility that IFRS motivates management to reflect the underlying 
firm economics by requiring impairment write-downs based on discounted cash flows and reversal 
of those write-downs when the asset’s economics change. Whereas the U.S. GAAP recoverability 
test based on undiscounted cash flows, coupled with the prohibition on reversing impairment 
losses provides both managerial discretion and incentives that allow for earnings management 
behavior. This possibility is consistent with Riedl’s (2004) suggestion that “the issuance of a 
‘brighter line’ standard, combined with (possibly increased) capital market pressures for achieving 
earnings targets during the latter part of the 1990’s (e.g., Dechow and Skinner 2000), may have 
enabled/driven managers to adopt more discretionary reporting choices under SFAS 121 relative 
to before the standard” (p. 850).  
Our results are specific to IFRS firms listed in the U.S. and are not generalizable to IFRS firms 
listed outside of the U.S. where different institutional features may influence reporting behavior. 
While this is a limitation of our study, it is also a strength in that we are able to compare the 
behavior of firms following two different standards within the same institutional setting. Our study 
is also limited to publically available information. As discussed in the paper there are differences, 
in addition to the recoverability test and the provision for impairment reversal, that exist between 
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IFRS and U.S. GAAP. However, access to the data required to quantify the effect of these 
differences is not publically available.  
Our study is subject to limitations.   First, U.S. listed firms and foreign private issuers may be 
fundamentally different, and this difference may drive our results. Table 6 in our robustness test 
addresses this issue by comparing the asset impairment reporting behavior of foreign private 
issuers using U.S. GAAP .to foreign private issuers using IFRS for U.S. reporting purposes.  
However, we acknowledge that this test does not eliminate this concern.  Second, our research 
design focuses on a firm’s incentives to manipulate earnings and ignores the cost of earnings 
management since the ex-ante cost of earnings management is unobservable.20  Finally, even 
though we have tried to hold managers’ incentive constant across U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms in 
our research design, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that manager’s incentives from 
reporting higher or lower earnings may be different for U.S. GAAP  and IFRS firms, which can 
drive different reporting behaviors as documented in this study. 
Regardless of these limitations, we provide evidence that differences in accounting standards 
result in differences in firms’ reporting behavior within strong institutional environments. These 
findings should be of interest to accounting standard-setters as they consider the effectiveness of 
specific reporting standards. 
 
  
                                                            
20 We thank the anonymous reviewer to bring these points to our attention. 
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions 
 
              WDP_ATit         = Firm i’s pre-tax asset write-down (reflected as a positive amount) for 
period t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1; 
     BATHINCENTit = Firm i’s proxy for “earnings big bath” incentive, equal to the change in 
firm i’s pre-write-down earnings from t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the  
end of t-1, when this change is below the median of non-zero negative  
values of this variable, and 0 otherwise; 
SMOOTHINCENTit = Firm i’s proxy for “earnings smoothing” incentive equal to the change in 
firm i’s pre-write-down earnings from t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the  
end of t-1, when this change is above the median of non-zero negative  
values of this variable, and 0 otherwise; 
             ∆INDROAit = The median change in firm i’s (2-digit SIC) industry ROA from period t-1 
to t; 
                ∆SALESit = Firm i’s percent change in sales from period t-1 to t; 
                   ∆OCFit = Firm i’s change in operating cash flows from period t-1 to t, divided by  
total assets at the end of t-1; 
    logMARKETCAPit = Firm i’s proxy for size, equal to natural logarithm of market capitalization, 
calculated as fiscal-year closing stock price multiplied by number of 
outstanding common shares for period t; 
                    MILLSit = Firm i’s inverse Mills ratio estimated from the Heckman's  selection model; 
                 TOBINQit = Firm i’s industry median Tobin's q; 
             logASSETSit = Natural log of firm i’s total assets; 
           LEVERAGEit = Firm i’s leverage ratio, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; 
                       ROAit = Firm i’s return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items, 
divided by total assets; 
                  logGDPit = Natural log of firm i’s country Gross Domestic Product; 
     LAWENGLISHit = An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has English 
legal systems, 0 otherwise; 
      LAWFRENCHit = An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has French 
legal systems, 0 otherwise; 
     LAWGERMANit = An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has German 
legal systems, 0 otherwise; 
    LAWSCANDINit = An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has 
Scandinavian legal systems, 0 otherwise; 
         LAWOTHERit = An indicator variable which takes value of 1 if firm i’s country has other 
legal systems, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
 
 
IFRS  
US 
GAAP  
Number of 
Firm-Year 
Companies with total assets greater than zero 
 (Compustat North America, 2004-2012) 
      
82,596 
   Eliminate companies that:       
      have no write-down data      (71,926) 
      have non-negative pretax write-down      (266) 
      have no recorded accounting standard      (17) 
      have missing regression variables      (2,697) 
      are listed on Canadian stock exchanges      (212) 
IFRS and US GAAP companies with negative 
  asset write-downs 
 578   6,900  7,478 
Foreign incorporated firms who use US GAAP        (1,475)  (1,475) 
Final IFRS and US GAAP firms  578  5,425  6,003 
       
Propensity score matching procedure:       
IFRS and US GAAP firms with no matching 
  counterpart 
  
(11) 
  
(4,858) 
  
(4,869) 
Final sample used in the study (firm-year)  567  567  1,134 
       
To develop our sample, we first identify all public companies within Compustat North America reporting a write-
down (Compustat data item “WDP”) from 2004 to 2012. This produces 7,478 potential firm-year observations, of 
which 578 are IFRS and 6,900 are U.S. GAAP firm-year observations. Then we identify a matched U.S. sample firm-
year for each IFRS firm-year, using a propensity matching process. Our final matched sample consists of 567 IFRS 
and 567 U.S. GAAP firm-year observations.   
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TABLE 2 
IFRS Sample Distribution 
 
Panel A: Final IFRS Sample—By Country 
 
Country  No. of Firm-Years  Percent of Total Observations 
Canada  189  33.3% 
United Kingdom  74  13.1% 
Australia  32  5.6% 
France  31  5.5% 
Germany  29  5.1% 
Netherlands  21  3.7% 
Switzerland  19  3.4% 
South Africa  18  3.2% 
Finland  14  2.5% 
Sweden  9  1.6% 
Other  131  23.1% 
Total  567  100.0% 
 
Panel B: Final IFRS Sample—By Year 
Year  No. of Firm-Years  Percent of Total Observations 
2004  5  0.9% 
2005  39  6.9% 
2006  31  5.5% 
2007  34  6.0% 
2008  53  9.4% 
2009  46  8.1% 
2010  56  9.9% 
2011 
2012 
 133 
170 
 23.5% 
30.0% 
Total  567  100.0% 
 
Panel C: Final IFRS Sample—By Industry 
GICS Code  Industries  
No. of  
Firm-Years  
Percent of Total 
Observations 
10  Energy  61  10.8% 
15  Materials  119  21.0% 
20  Industrials  47  8.3% 
25  Consumer Discretionary  69  12.2% 
30  Consumer Staples  50  8.8% 
35  Health Care  66  11.6% 
40  Financials  35  6.2% 
45  Information Technology  41  7.2% 
50  Telecommunication Services  52  9.2% 
55  Utilities  27  4.8% 
Total    567  100% 
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This table reports the summary statistics for the variables in our sample. The sample consists of 567 IFRS and 567 
U.S. GAAP firm-year observations over the period 2004–2012. Variables are defined in the Appendix.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively using two-sided t-test 
for mean difference. None of the differences is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
  
U.S. Matched Companies  
(N=567)  
IFRS Matched Companies  
(N=567)   
Variable  Mean Median Std. Dev  Mean Median Std. Dev  
Mean 
Difference 
WDP_AT   0.020  0.004 0.054   0.023 0.004 0.058         -0.003 
BATHINCENT  -0.031  0.000 0.082  -0.026 0.000 0.065   -0.005 
SMOOTHINCENT   0.032  0.000 0.094   0.033 0.000 0.088         -0.001 
∆INDROA  -0.003 -0.001 0.012  -0.002 0.000 0.014         -0.005 
∆SALES   0.084  0.045 0.378   0.126 0.043 0.476         -0.042 
∆OCFit   0.008  0.005 0.087   0.011 0.005 0.085         -0.003 
logMARKETCAP   7.080  7.524 2.625   7.315 7.739 2.831         -0.235 
Book-to-Market   0.922  0.575 1.247   0.907 0.618 1.027          0.015 
ROA  -0.015  0.025 0.172  -0.022 0.019 0.175          0.006 
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TABLE 4 
Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 
Panel A: Pearson and Spearman Correlations for Matched U.S. GAAP Sample (n = 567) 
Variable  WDP_AT  
BATH 
INCENT  
SMOOTH 
INCENT  ∆INDROA  ∆SALES  ∆OCF  
logMARKET
CAP 
WDP_AT     -0.209***  0.295***     0.000    -0.079*  -0.095**    -0.314*** 
BATHINCENT  -0.274***    0.128***    0.168***     0.087**  0.353***   0.293*** 
SMOOTHINCENT   0.151***  0.260***       0.024     0.212***  0.343***  -0.209*** 
∆INDROA   -0.089**  0.196***    0.083**       0.113***   0.068      0.081* 
∆SALES   -0.051  0.234***  0.194***    0.160***     0.292***      0.046 
∆OCF   -0.080*  0.334***  0.323***     0.071*  0.294***        0.087** 
logMARKETCAP  -0.440***  0.345***   -0.139***    0.137***     0.157***  0.125***   
 
Panel B: Pearson and Spearman Correlations for Matched IFRS Sample (n = 567) 
Variable  WDP_AT  
BATH 
INCENT  
SMOOTH 
INCENT  ∆INDROA  ∆SALES  ∆OCF  
logMARKET
CAP 
WDP_AT      -0.130***  0.116***    -0.053     0.009   0.032    -0.380*** 
BATHINCENT  -0.214***    0.150***     0.042     0.050  0.128***  0.289*** 
SMOOTHINCENT    0.100**  0.294***       0.035  0.165***  0.271***    -0.306*** 
∆INDROA   -0.112***     0.061    0.073*       0.077*   0.065     0.091** 
∆SALES   -0.030  0.150***  0.177***  0.091**    0.141***    -0.100** 
∆OCF   -0.004  0.192***  0.178***  0.100**  0.232***      -0.112*** 
logMARKETCAP   -0.446***  0.248***   -0.203***    0.110***     0.023  -0.039   
 
This table reports correlation coefficients between the variables in our sample. Pearson correlation coefficients are presented at the top-right half of the table; and 
Spearman correlations are presented at the bottom-left half of the table.  Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively using two-sided t-statistics. 
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TABLE 5 
Asset Write-Downs and Unexpectedly High or Low Earnings: U.S. GAAP versus IFRS  
 
 Pred. U.S. GAAP IFRS IFRS Heckman Difference 
 Sign OLS OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage  
Variables  (t-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat) (t-stat) (χ2-stat) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (1) -(4) 
BATHINCENT -  -0.100***  
(-4.68) 
 -0.005 
(-0.11) 
   0.017 
 (0.41) 
    -0.117** 
    (3.68) 
SMOOTHINCENT +   0.185***  
 (2.78) 
   0.002  
 (0.06) 
   0.010 
 (0.44) 
     0.175*** 
    (5.55) 
∆INDROA -   0.367***  
 (3.99) 
 -0.049  
(-0.36) 
  -0.041 
(-0.31) 
     0.408** 
    (3.25) 
∆SALES - -0.016**  
(-2.24) 
 -0.002 
(-0.27) 
  -0.001 
(-0.21) 
    -0.015 
    (1.31) 
∆OCF -  -0.066* 
(-1.88) 
-0.012 
(-1.45) 
  -0.008 
(-1.05) 
    -0.058 
    (1.81) 
logMARKETCAP -  -0.004*** 
(-6.21) 
 -0.010*** 
(-4.00) 
  -0.014*** 
(-6.00) 
     0.010*** 
    (9.95) 
MILLS       0.216*** 
 (3.25) 
 
TOBINQ       0.750*** 
 (9.76) 
  
logASSETS       0.245*** 
(31.46) 
  
LEVERAGE      -0.551*** 
 (-8.46) 
  
ROA      -0.918*** 
(-15.58) 
  
logGDP        0.003 
  (0.17) 
  
LAWENGLISH       0.948*** 
  (8.70) 
  
LAWFRENCH       0.527*** 
  (4.68) 
  
LAWGERMAN       0.066 
  (0.57) 
  
LAWSCANDIN       0.698*** 
  (5.43) 
  
LAWOTHER       1.364*** 
  (7.28) 
  
Intercept   0.057*** 
(8.57) 
 0.065*** 
(2.72) 
-5.681*** 
(-12.88) 
  0.025 
 (1.15) 
 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy  Yes Yes  Yes  
Country Dummy  Yes Yes  Yes  
Observations  567 567 245,596 567  
Adjusted R2  0.24 0.20  0.22  
This table presents the multivariate regression analysis and comparison of coefficients conducted to test whether there 
are differences in the asset write-down behavior of U.S. GAAP and IFRS firms. We estimate the regression models 
using the pooled data over the period of 2004– 2012. The dependent variable is WDP_AT which is pre-tax asset write-
down (reflected as a positive amount) for the year, divided by total assets for the prior year. All other variables are 
defined in the Appendix. For IFRS firms, we report results from the two-stage Heckman model (shown in columns 3 
and 4) as well as from the OLS model (shown in column 2).  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-sided t-test.  
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TABLE 6 
Foreign Incorporated Firms Adopting U.S. GAAP versus IFRS in U.S. 
 
 Pred. U.S. GAAP IFRS IFRS Heckman Difference 
 Sign OLS OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage  
Variables  (t-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat) (t-stat) (χ2-stat) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (1) -(4) 
BATHINCENT -  -0.248**  
(-2.45) 
 -0.001 
(-0.03) 
   0.017 
 (0.41) 
   -0.265** 
   (4.81) 
SMOOTHINCENT +   0.107 
 (1.63) 
 -0.004 
(-0.16) 
   0.010 
 (0.44) 
    0.097* 
   (2.43) 
∆INDROA -   0.109  
 (1.15) 
 -0.054 
(-0.40) 
  -0.041 
(-0.31) 
    0.150 
   (0.60) 
∆SALES -   0.004  
 (1.32) 
 -0.002 
(-0.23) 
  -0.001 
(-0.21) 
    0.005 
   (0.28) 
∆OCF -  -0.087 
(-1.36) 
 -0.009 
(-0.36) 
  -0.008 
(-1.05) 
   -0.079* 
   (2.31) 
logMARKETCAP -  -0.004*** 
(-3.67) 
 -0.010*** 
(-3.95) 
  -0.014*** 
(-6.00) 
    0.010*** 
   (9.01) 
MILLS        0.216*** 
  (3.25) 
 
TOBINQ        0.750*** 
   (9.76) 
  
logASSETS        0.245*** 
 (31.46) 
  
LEVERAGE       -0.551*** 
  (-8.46) 
  
ROA       -0.918*** 
(-15.58) 
  
logGDP        0.003 
   (0.17) 
  
LAWENGLISH        0.948*** 
   (8.70) 
  
LAWFRENCH        0.527*** 
   (4.68) 
  
LAWGERMAN        0.066 
   (0.57) 
  
LAWSCANDIN        0.698*** 
   (5.43) 
  
LAWOTHER        1.364*** 
   (7.28) 
  
Intercept   0.041*** 
(2.79) 
 0.069*** 
(2.75) 
   -5.681*** 
(-12.88) 
  0.025 
 (1.15) 
 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes  Yes  
Industry Dummy  Yes Yes  Yes  
Country Dummy  Yes Yes  Yes  
Observations  1,475 567 245,596 567  
Adjusted R2  0.11 0.20  0.22  
This table presents the multivariate regression analysis and comparison of coefficients conducted to test whether there 
are differences in the asset write-down behavior of foreign firms that use U.S. GAAP reporting in the U.S. to foreign 
firms that use IFRS for U.S. reporting purposes. We estimate the regression models using the pooled data over the 
period of 2004– 2012. The dependent variable is WDP_AT. All variables are defined in Appendix. For IFRS firms, 
we report results from the two-stage Heckman model (shown in columns 3 and 4) as well as from the OLS model 
(shown in column 2).   *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, 
based on two-sided t-test.  
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TABLE 7 
The Reversals of Asset Write-Downs for IFRS Firms 
 
Variables Pred. Sign  IFRS  IFRS Heckman 
  OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
  (t-stat) (z-stat) (t-stat) 
BATHINCENTit -         0.004 
       (0.08) 
         0.026 
       (0.50) 
SMOOTHINCENTit +         0.002 
       (0.06) 
         0.010 
       (0.47) 
∆INDROAit -        -0.031 
      (-0.21) 
        -0.022 
      (-0.16) 
∆SALESit -        -0.003 
      (-0.33) 
        -0.002 
      (-0.34) 
∆OCFit -        -0.010 
      (-0.37) 
        -0.005 
      (-1.24) 
logMARKETCAPit -        -0.010*** 
      (-3.94) 
        -0.014*** 
      (-5.91) 
REVERSALit         -0.001 
      (-0.06) 
        -0.001 
      (-0.20) 
REVERSALit× 
  BATHINCENTit 
        -0.067 
      (-0.74) 
        -0.073 
      (-0.55) 
REVERSALit×     
  SMOOTHINCENTit 
        -0.070 
      (-0.75) 
        -0.096 
      (-1.17) 
MILLSit            0.216*** 
       (3.25) 
TOBINQ       0.750*** 
   (9.76) 
 
logASSETSit       0.245*** 
 (31.46) 
 
LEVERAGEit      -0.551*** 
  (-8.46) 
 
ROAit      -0.918*** 
(-15.58) 
 
logGDPit       0.003 
   (0.17) 
 
LAWENGLISHit       0.948*** 
   (8.70) 
 
LAWFRENCHit       0.527*** 
   (4.68) 
 
LAWGERMANit       0.066 
   (0.57) 
 
LAWSCANDINit       0.698*** 
   (5.43) 
 
LAWOTHERit       1.364*** 
   (7.28) 
 
Intercept        0.067*** 
     (2.72) 
   -5.681*** 
(-12.88) 
       0.025 
      (1.15) 
Year Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummy  Yes  Yes 
Observations  567 245,596 567 
Adjusted R2  0.20  0.22 
This table presents the multivariate regression analysis to test whether asset impairment reversals may influence the 
asset write-down behavior of foreign firms that use IFRS for U.S. reporting purposes. We estimate the regression 
models using the pooled data over the period of 2004– 2012. The dependent variable is WDP_AT. The variable, 
REVERSAL, is coded 1 if a firm has a reversal of a long-lived impairment loss during our sample period and zero, 
otherwise.  All other variables are defined in Appendix.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-sided t-test.  
47 
 
TABLE 8 
U.S. GAAP Firms – The Entire Population 
 
Variables  
Predicted 
Sign  
U.S. GAAP  
OLS 
 (t-stat) 
BATHINCENTit  -              -0.112***  
           (-3.14) 
SMOOTHINCENTit  +               0.077***  
            (3.94) 
∆INDROAit  -              -0.038  
           (-0.48) 
∆SALESit  -                0.007*  
             (1.73) 
∆OCFit  -               -0.067*** 
            (-3.14) 
logMARKETCAPit  -               -0.006*** 
          (-10.85) 
Intercept                  0.074*** 
             (5.46) 
Year Dummy    Yes 
Industry Dummy    Yes 
Country Dummy    Yes 
Obs    5,425 
Adjusted R2    0.10 
 
This table presents the multivariate regression analysis using the full U.S. GAAP sample (5,425 U.S. GAAP firm-year 
observations). We estimate the regression model using the pooled data over the period of 2004– 2012. The dependent 
variable is WDP_AT. All variables are defined in Appendix.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively, based on two-sided t-test.  
 
   
   
   
   
  
